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Newsfeed algorithms frequently amplify misinformation and other low-quality content. How
can social media platforms more effectively promote reliable information? Existing ap-
proaches are difficult to scale and vulnerable to manipulation. In this paper, we propose
using the political diversity of a website’s audience as a quality signal. Using news source
reliability ratings from domain experts and web browsing data from a diverse sample of 6,890
U.S. citizens, we first show that websites with more extreme and less politically diverse au-
diences have lower journalistic standards. We then incorporate audience diversity into a
standard collaborative filtering framework and show that our improved algorithm increases
the trustworthiness of websites suggested to users — especially those who most frequently
consume misinformation — while keeping recommendations relevant. These findings suggest
that partisan audience diversity is a valuable signal of higher journalistic standards that
should be incorporated into algorithmic ranking decisions.
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2Concerns continue to grow about the prevalence of misinformation on social media platforms [25,
39], including during the recent COVID-19 pandemic [40]. These types of content often exploit
people’s tendency to prefer pro-attitudinal information [20], which can be exacerbated by platform
content recommendations [5, 6]. In this paper, we explore a possible algorithmic approach to
mitigate the spread of misinformation and promote content with higher journalistic standards
online.
Social media platform recommendation algorithms frequently amplify bias in human consump-
tion decisions. Though the information diets of Americans are less slanted in practice than many
assume, the people who consume the most political news are most affected by the tendency toward
selective exposure [15]. As a result, the news audience is far more polarized than the public as a
whole [9, 17]. Although the prevalence of so-called “fake news” online is rather limited and concen-
trated among relatively narrow audiences [2, 3, 14–16, 18], content that generally appeals to these
tendencies — which include low-quality or false news — may generate high levels of readership
or engagement [39], prompting algorithms that seek to maximize engagement to distribute them
more widely.
Prior research indicates that existing recommendation algorithms tend to promote items that
have already achieved popularity [12, 30]. This bias may have several effects on the consumption
of low-quality and false news. First, sorting the news by engagement can exacerbate polariza-
tion by increasing in-group bias and discouraging consumption among outgroup members [36].
Second, it may contribute to information cascades, amplifying differences in rankings from small
variations or random fluctuations and degrading the overall quality of information consumed by
users [8, 11, 21, 26, 33]. Third, exposure to engagement metrics makes users more likely to share
and less likely to fact-check highly engaging content from low-credibility sources, increasing vul-
nerability to misinformation [4]. Finally, popularity bias in recommendation systems can create
socio-algorithmic vulnerabilities to threats such as automated amplifiers, which exploit algorithmic
content rankings to spread low-quality and inflammatory content to like-minded audiences [34, 37].
Given the speed and scale of social media, assessing directly the quality of every piece of
content or the behavior of each user is infeasible. Online platforms are instead seeking to include
signals about news quality in their content recommendation algorithms. A vast literature examines
how to assess the credibility of online sources [7, 19] and the reputations of individual online
users [1, 13], which could in principle bypass the problem of checking each individual piece of
content. Unfortunately, many of these methods are hard to scale to large groups and/or depend
upon context-specific information about the type of content being generated (e.g., wikis). As a
3result, they are not easily applied to news content recommendations on social media platforms.
Another approach is to try to evaluate the quality of websites directly [43], but scaling such
an approach would likely be costly and cause lags in the evaluation of novel content. Similarly,
while crowdsourced website evaluations have been shown to be generally reliable in distinguishing
between high and low quality news sources [31], such signals are vulnerable to manipulation as well
as to delays in evaluating new sources.
Building on the literature about the benefits of diversity at the group level [22, 35], we instead
propose using the partisan diversity of the audience of a news source as a signal of its quality.
This approach has two key advantages. First, audience partisan diversity can be computed at scale
given that information about the partisanship of users is available or can be inferred in a reliable
manner. Second, because diversity is a property of the audience and not of its level of engagement,
it is less susceptible to manipulation if one can detect inauthentic partisan accounts [38, 41, 42].
These two conditions (inferring partisanship reliably and preventing abuse by automated amplifi-
cation/deception) could easily be met by the major social media platforms, which routinely collect
a wealth of signals about their users and their authenticity.
We evaluate the merits of our proposed approach using data from two sources: a comprehensive
data set of web traffic history from 6,890 Americans, collected along with surveys of self-reported
partisan information from respondents in the YouGov Pulse survey panel, and a data set of 3,765
news source reliability scores of web domains compiled by trained experts in journalism and pro-
vided by NewsGuard [29]. We first establish that domain pageviews are not associated with overall
news reliability, highlighting the potential problem with algorithmic recommendation systems that
rely on popularity and related metrics of engagement. We next define measures of audience partisan
diversity and show that these measures correlate with news reliability better than popularity does.
Finally, we study the effect of incorporating audience partisan diversity into algorithmic ranking
decisions. When we create a variant of the standard collaborative filtering algorithm that explic-
itly takes audience partisan diversity into account, our new algorithm provides more trustworthy
recommendations than the standard approach with only a small loss of relevance.
These results demonstrate that diversity in audience partisanship can serve as a useful signal
of news reliability at the domain level, a finding that has important implications for the design of
content recommendation algorithms used by online platforms. Although the news recommendation
technologies deployed by platforms are more sophisticated than the approach tested here, our
results highlight a fundamental weakness of algorithmic ranking methods that prioritize content
that generates engagement and suggest a new metric that could help improve the reliability of the
4FIG. 1. Relationship between audience size and news reliability by domain (Pearson r = 0.05, two-sided
p = 0.12). Reliability scores provided by NewsGuard [29].
recommendations that are provided to users.
RESULTS
Popularity does not predict news reliability
To motivate our study, we first demonstrate that the popular news content that algorithmic
recommendations often highlight is not necessarily reliable. To do so, we examine the relationship
between audience size and news reliability in the YouGov Pulse data. Due to skew in audience
size among domains, we use a logarithmic scale for the size. Fig. 1 shows that the amount of
traffic that a website attracts is not associated with its news reliability, which we measure using
NewsGuard scores (see Methods A). We do find a significant association if we consider websites
with predominantly Democratic audiences (Pearson r = 0.08, two-sided p = 0.02) separately from
those with predominantly Republican audiences (Pearson r = −0.06, two-sided p = 0.34), but the
strength of association between the two variables is very weak overall (Pearson r = 0.05, two-sided
p = 0.12).
5FIG. 2. Average audience partisanship versus variance. Left panel: user level. Right panel: pageview level.
Domains for which we have NewsGuard reliability scores [29] are shaded in blue (where darker shades equal
lower scores). Domains with no available score are plotted in gray.
Audience partisan diversity is a signal for high-reliability news
In contrast, we observe that sites with greater audience partisan diversity tend to have higher
NewsGuard scores while those with lower levels of diversity, and correspondingly more homogeneous
partisan audiences, tend to have lower reliability scores. Fig. 2 shows how NewsGuard scores vary
with both mean audience partisanship and variance in audience partisanship. The latter is our
primary measure of audience partisan diversity at the website level (see Methods B).
As Fig. 2 indicates, unreliable websites with very low NewsGuard scores are concentrated in
the tails of the distribution, where partisanship is most extreme and audience partisan diversity
is, by necessity, very low. This relationship is not symmetrical: low-reliability websites (whose
markers are darker shades of blue in the figure) are especially concentrated in the right tail, which
corresponds to websites with largely Republican audiences. The data in Fig. 2 also suggests
that the reliability of a website may be associated not just with the variance of the distribution
of audience partisanship slants, but also with its mean. To account for this, we compute the
coefficient of partial correlation between NewsGuard reliability scores and the variance of audience
partisanship given the mean audience partisanship of each website. Compared with popularity, we
find a stronger (and significant) correlation regardless of whether mean partisanship and audience
partisan diversity are calculated by weighting individual audience members equally (user level, left
panel: partial correlation r = 0.38, two-sided p < 10−4) or by how often they visited a given site
(pageview level, right panel: partial correlation r = 0.22, two-sided p < 10−4).
6FIG. 3. Relationship between audience partisan diversity and news reliability for websites whose average
visitor is a Democrat or a Republican. Left panel: variance computed at user level. Right panel: variance
computed at pageview level. News reliability scores from NewsGuard [29].
We study the diversity–reliability relationship in more detail in Fig. 3, which differentiates be-
tween websites with audiences that are mostly Republican and those with audiences that are mostly
Democratic. Consistent with what we report above, Fig. 3 shows that audience partisan diversity
is positively associated with news reliability. Again, this relationship holds both when individual
audience members are weighted equally (user level, left panel) and when they are weighted by
their number of accesses (pageview level, right panel), though the association is stronger at the
user level (standardized OLS coefficient: β = 0.28 (0.02) at user level; β = 0.17 (0.03) at pageview
level). In addition, we find that the relationship is stronger for sites whose average visitor identifies
as a Republican (standardized OLS coefficient of Republican domains: β = 0.41 (0.05) at user
level; β = 0.30 (0.07) at pageview level) versus those whose average visitor identifies as a Democrat
(standardized OLS coefficient of Democrat domains: β = 0.16 (0.03) at user level; β = 0.04 (0.03)
at pageview level), which is consistent with Fig. 2. Full regression tables can be found in Supple-
mentary Materials.
Of course, variance in audience partisanship is not the only possible way to define audience par-
tisan diversity; alternative definitions can be used (e.g., entropy; see Methods B). As a robustness
check, we therefore consider a range of alternative definition of audience partisan diversity and
obtain results that are qualitatively similar to the ones presented here, though results are strongest
for variance (see Supplementary Materials).
7Audience partisan diversity produces trustworthy, relevant recommendations
To understand the potential effects of incorporating audience partisan diversity into algorithmic
recommendations, we next consider how recommendations from a standard user-based collaborative
filtering (CF) algorithm [24, 32] change if we include audience partisan diversity as an additional
signal. We call this modified version of the algorithm CF+D, which stands for Collaborative
Filtering + Diversity (see Methods C for formal definition).
In classic CF, users are presented with recommendations drawn from a set of items (in this case,
web domains) that have been “rated” highly by those other users whose tastes are most similar to
theirs. Lacking explicit data about how a user would “rate” a given web domain, we use a quantity
derived from the number of user pageviews to a domain (based on TF-IDF; see also Methods C)
as the rating.
To evaluate our method, we follow a standard supervised learning workflow. We first divide
web traffic data for each user in the YouGov Pulse panel into training and testing sets by domain
(see Methods D). We then compute similarities in traffic patterns between users for all domains
in the training set (not just news websites) and use the computed similarities to predict the afore-
mentioned domain-level pageviews metric on the test set. The domains that receive the highest
predicted ratings (i.e., expected TF-IDF-transformed pageviews) are then selected as recommen-
dations.
Note that if a user has not visited a domain, then the number of visits for that domain will
be zero. In general, due to the long tail in user interests [12], we cannot infer that the user has a
negative preference toward a website just because they have not visited it. The user may simply
be unaware of the site. We therefore follow standard practice in the machine learning literature
in only evaluating recommendations for content for which we have ratings (i.e., visits in the test
set), though in practice actual newsfeed algorithms rank items from a broader set of inputs, which
typically includes content the user may not have seen (for example, content shared by friends [5]).
To produce recommendations for a given user, we consider all the domains visited by the user
in the test set for which ratings are available from one or more respondents in a neighborhood
of most similar users (domains with no neighborhood rating are discarded since neither CF nor
CF+D can make a prediction for them, see Methods C) and for which we have a NewsGuard score
(i.e., a reliability score). We then rank those domains by their rating computed using either CF
or CF+D. This process produces a ranked list of news domains and reliability scores from both
the standard CF algorithm and the modified CF+D algorithm, which incorporates the audience
8FIG. 4. Trustworthiness of recommended domains by length of ranked list k. Left: Trustworthiness based
on scores from NewsGuard [29]. Right: proportion of domains labeled as ‘trustworthy’, also by NewsGuard.
Actual visits v are normalized using TF-IDF (see Methods C). Each bin represents the average computed
on the top-k recommendations for all users in the YouGov panel with ≥ k recommendations in their test
sets. Bars represent the standard error of the mean. The values of k are capped so that each bin has ≥ 100
users in it (see Supplementary Materials for plot with all values of k). In this figure, both CF and CF+D
compute the similarity between users using the Kendall τ correlation coefficient (see Methods C). We obtain
qualitatively similar results using the Pearson correlation coefficient (see Supplementary Materials).
partisan diversity signal. We evaluate these lists using two different measures of trustworthiness,
that are computed for the top k domains in each list: either the mean score (a number in the 0–100
range), or the proportion of domains with a score of 60 or higher, which NewsGuard classifies as
indicating that a site “generally adheres to basic standards of credibility and transparency” [29]
(see Methods E).
By varying the number of top domains k, we can evaluate how trustworthiness changes as
the length of the list of recommendations increases. In Fig. 4 we plot the trustworthiness of the
recommended domains as a function of k. We restrict values of k to 1–28, the values for which there
are at least 100 users in each bin (plots spanning the full range are available in Supplementary
Materials). Each panel compares the average trustworthiness of domains ranked by CF and CF+D
with, as a baseline, the trustworthiness of websites users visited in the test set ranked by their
TF-IDF-transformed number of visits (i.e., pageviews). This baseline captures the trustworthiness
of the websites the users actually visited after adjusting for the fact that more popular websites
tend to attract more visits in general.
We observe in Fig. 4 that the trustworthiness of recommendations produced by CF+D is signif-
icantly better than both standard CF recommendations and baseline statistics from user behavior.
9FIG. 5. Accuracy of domain recommendations by length of ranked list k. Left: Precision (proportion of
correctly ranked sites) by length of ranked list k (higher is better). Right: RMSE (root mean squared error)
of predicted pageviews for top k ranked domains by length of ranked list k (lower is better). Each bin
represents the average computed on the top-k recommendations of all users with ≥ k recommendations in
their test sets. Bars represent the standard error of the mean. The values of k are capped so that each bin
has ≥ 100 users in it (see Supplementary Materials for plot with all values of k). In this figure, both CF and
CF+D compute the similarity between users using the Kendall τ correlation coefficient (see Methods C). We
obtain qualitatively similar results using the Pearson correlation coefficient (see Supplementary Materials).
In particular, CF produces less trustworthy rankings than the user visit baseline (for small values
of k the difference is within the margin of error), while CF+D produces rankings that are more
trustworthy than both CF and the baseline across different levels of k. These results suggest that
audience partisan diversity can provide a valuable signal to improve the reliability of algorithmic
recommendations.
Of course, the above exercise would be meaningless if our proposed algorithm recommended
websites that do not interest users. Because CF+D alters the set of recommended domains to
prioritize those visited by more diverse partisan audiences, it may be suggesting sources that offer
counter-attitudinal information or that users do not find relevant. In this sense, CF+D could
represent an audience-based analogue of the topic diversification strategy from the recommender
systems literature [44]. If so, a loss of predictive ability would be expected.
Fig. 5 compares the accuracy of CF+D in predicting user visits to domain in the test set with
that of CF. To evaluate accuracy, we compute two metrics: the fraction of correctly predicted
domains (precision) and root mean squared error (RMSE), both as a function of the number of
recommended domains k (see Methods F for definitions). Note that precision increases with k by
definition because we are comparing an increasingly large set of recommendations with a list of
10
fixed size. Because each bin averages over users with at least k domains in their test set, when
k reaches the maximum size of the recommendation list we can make, the precision necessarily
becomes 100%. The plots in Fig. 5 do not reach this level — they include only bins with at least
100 users in them — but trend upward with k. (In the Supplementary Materials, we show plots
that include results for all values of k.)
Our results are generally encouraging. In both cases, precision is low and RMSE is high for low
values of k, but error levels start to stabilize around k = 10, which suggests that making correct
recommendations for shorter lists (i.e. k < 10) is more challenging than for longer ones. Moreover,
comparing CF+D with CF, we see that though accuracy declines slightly for CF+D relative to CF,
the difference is not statistically significant for all but small values of k, suggesting that CF+D is
still capable of producing relevant recommendations.
Audience partisan diversity mitigates selective exposure to misinformation
The results above demonstrate that incorporating audience partisan diversity can increase the
trustworthiness of recommended domains while still providing users with relevant recommenda-
tions. However, we know that exposure to unreliable news outlets varies dramatically across the
population. For instance, exposure to untrustworthy content is highly concentrated among a nar-
row subset of highly active news consumers with heavily slanted information diets [14, 18]. We
therefore take advantage of the survey and behavioral data available on participants in the Pulse
panel to consider how CF+D effects vary by individual partisanship (self-reported via survey),
behavioral measures such as volume of news consumption activity and information diet slant, and
contextual factors that are relevant to algorithm performance such as similarity with other users.
In this section, we again produce recommendations using either CF or CF+D and measure
their difference in trustworthiness with respect to a baseline based on user visits (specifically the
ranking by TF-IDF-normalized number of visits v; see Methods C). However, we analyze the
results differently than those reported above. Rather than considering recommendations for lists
of varying length k, we create recommendations for different subgroups based on the factors of
interest and compare how the effects of the CF+D approach vary between those groups.
To facilitate comparisons in performance between subgroups that do not depend on list length
k, we define a new metric to summarize the overall trustworthiness of the ranked lists obtained
with CF and CF+D over all possible values of k. Since users tend to pay less attention to items
ranked lower in the list [23], it is reasonable to assume that lower-ranked items ought to contribute
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less to the overall trustworthiness of a given ranking. Let us consider a universe of domains D as
the set of items to rank. Inspired by prior approaches on stochastic processes based on ranking [10],
we consider a discounting method that posits that the probability of selecting domain d ∈ D from
a given ranked recommendation list decays as a power law of its rank in the list:
Pr {X = d} = r
−α
d∑
h r
−α
h
(1)
where X ∈ D is a random variable denoting the probabilistic outcome of the selection from the
ranked list, rd ∈ N is the rank of a generic d ∈ D, and α ≥ 0 is the exponent of power-law decay
(when α = 0, all domains are equally likely; when α > 0, top-ranked domains are more likely to
be selected).
Let us now consider probabilistic selections from two different rankings, represented by random
variables X and X ′, where X is the random variable of the ranking produced by one of the
two recommendation algorithms (either CF or CF+D) and X ′ is the selection from the baseline
ranking based on user visits. Using Eq. 1, we compute the expected change in trustworthiness Q
from switching the selection from X ′ to X,
∆Q = E [Q(X)]− E [Q(X ′)] (2)
where the expectations of Q(X) and Q(X ′) are taken with regard to the respective rankings (see
Methods G). A value of ∆Q > 0 indicates that algorithmic recommendations are more trustworthy
than what users actually accessed. If ∆Q < 0, the trustworthiness of a ranked list is lower than
the baseline from user visits. (To ensure that the results below are not affected by the discounting
method we employ, we report qualitatively similar results obtained without any discounting for a
selection of values of k in the Supplementary Materials.)
Applying Eq. 2, we find that CF+D substantially increases trustworthiness for users who tend
to visit sources that lean conservative (Fig. 6(a)) and for those who have the most polarized
information diets (in either direction; see Fig. 6(c)), two segments of users who are especially likely
to be exposed to unreliable information [2, 14, 18]. In both cases, CF+D achieves the greatest
improvement among the groups where CF reduces the trustworthiness of recommendations the
most, which highlights the pitfalls of algorithmic recommendations for vulnerable audiences and
the benefits of prioritizing sources with diverse audiences in making recommendations to those
users.
Note that even though the YouGov sample includes self-reported information on both party ID
and partisanship of respondents, for stratification we use only the former (Fig. 6(b)) but not the
12
latter, to avoid circularity given the definition of CF+D, which does rely on the latter; instead, in
Figs 6(a) and 6(c) we chose to stratify on an external measure of news diet slant (calculated from
a large sample of social media users; see Methods H).
We also observe that CF+D has strong positive effects for users who identify as Republicans or
lean Republican (Fig. 6(b)) and for those who are the most active news consumers in terms of both
total consumption (Fig. 6(d)) and number of distinct sources (Fig. 6(e)). Furthermore, since the
two recommendation schemes considered here (CF and CF+D) are predicated on identifying similar
users according to their tastes and behaviors, we also segment the users of the YouGov sample
according to the degree of similarity with their nearest neighbors (identified based on Kendall’s
rank correlation coefficient between user vectors; see Methods C). Stratifying on the average of
nearest neighbor similarities, we find that CF+D results in improvements for the users whose
browsing behavior is most similar to others in their neighborhood and who might thus be most at
risk of “echo chamber” effects (Fig. 6(f)). Finally, when we group users by the trustworthiness of
the domains they visit, we find that the greatest improvements from the CF+D algorithm occur for
users who are exposed to the least trustworthy information (Fig. 6(g)). By contrast, the standard
CF algorithm often recommends websites that are less trustworthy than those that respondents
actually visit (∆Q < 0).
METHODS
A. Data
Our analysis combines two sources of data. The first is the NewsGuard News Website Reliability
Index [29], a list of web domain reliability ratings compiled by a team of professional journalists and
news editors. The data that we licensed for research purposes includes scores of 3,765 web domains
on a 100-point scale based on a number of journalistic criteria such as editorial responsibility,
accountability, and financial transparency.1 NewsGuard categorizes web domains into four main
groups: “Green” domains, which have a score of 60 or more points and are considered reliable;
“Red” domains, which score less than 60 points and are considered unreliable; “Satire” domains,
which should not be regarded as news sources regardless of their score; and “Platform” domains
like Facebook or YouTube that primarily host content generated by users. The mean reliability
score for domains in the data is 69.6; the distribution of scores is shown in Fig. 7.
1 These data were current as of November 12, 2019 and do not reflect subsequent updates; see Code and Data
Availability for more information.
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FIG. 6. Effect of CF and CF+D (versus actual visits baseline) on trustworthiness by user characteristics
and behavior. (a) Ideological slant of visited domains (terciles using scores from Bakshy et al. [5]). (b) Self-
reported party ID from YouGov Pulse responses as measured on a 7-point scale (1–3: Democrats including
people who lean Democrat but do not identify as Democrats, 4: Independents, 5–7: Republicans including
people who lean Republican but do not identify as Republicans). (c) Absolute slant of visited domains
(terciles using scores from Bakshy et al.). (d) Total online activity (TF-IDF-transformed pageviews; terciles).
(e) Distinct number of domains visited (terciles). (f) Average user-user similarity with nearest n = 10
neighbors in training set (terciles) (g) Trustworthiness of domains visited by users (in training set; terciles).
Bars represent the standard error of the mean of each stratum. Change in trustworthiness ∆Q based on
scores from NewsGuard [29].
14
FIG. 7. Distribution of NewsGuard scores (N = 3,726) by trustworthiness rating. Domains that score below
60 points (i.e., untrustworthy) on the rubric used by NewsGuard [29] are shown in white. Those that score
60 or above are shown in green. The bin width is 5; the bin containing score 60 also includes a few domains
with lower scores. The dashed line indicates the average score in the data.
The second data source is the YouGov Pulse panel, a sample of U.S.-based Internet users whose
web traffic was collected in anonymized form with their prior consent. This traffic data was collected
during seven periods between October 2016 and March 2019 (see Table I).
A total of 6,890 participants provided data. In addition to their web traffic logs, participants
reported their partisanship on a seven-point scale in online surveys. We perform a number of
pre-processing steps on this data. We combine all waves into a single sample. We pool web traffic
for each domain that received thirty or more unique visitors. Finally, we use the self-reported
partisanship of the visitors to estimate mean audience partisanship and audience partisan diversity,
which we estimate using different measures described next and evaluated in the Supplementary
Materials.
B. Definition of audience partisan diversity
To measure audience partisan diversity, first define Nj as the count of participants who visited
a web domain and reported their political affiliation to be equal to j for j = 1, . . . , 7 (where 1
= strong Democrat and 7 = strong Republican). The total number of participants who visited
15
TABLE I. YouGov Pulse respondent data summary.
Duration Respondents Domains Pageviews
Oct. 7, 2016 – Nov. 14, 2016 3,251 158,706 26,715,631
Oct. 25, 2017 – Nov. 21, 2017 2,100 104,513 14,247,987
Jun. 11, 2018 – Jul. 31, 2018 1,718 108,953 15,212,281
Jul. 12, 2018 – Aug. 2, 2018 2,000 74,469 9,395,659
Oct. 5, 2018 – Nov. 5, 2018 3,332 98,850 19,288,382
Nov. 12, 2018 – Jan. 16, 2019 4,907 117,510 21,093,638
Jan. 24, 2019 – Mar. 11, 2019 2,000 113,700 27,482,462
the domain is thus N =
∑
j Nj , and the fraction of participants with a partisanship value of j
is pj = Nj/N . Denote the partisanship of the i-th individual as si. We calculate the following
metrics to measure audience partisan diversity:
Variance: σ2 = N−1
∑
(si − s)2, where s is average partisanship;
Shannon’s entropy: S = −∑ p(j) log p(j), where p(j) is estimated in the following three dif-
ferent ways: (i) p(j) = pj (maximum likelihood); (ii) p(j) =
Nj+α
N+7α (mean of the posterior
distribution of Dirichlet prior with α = 1); and (iii) the method of Nemenman et al. [28],
which uses a mixture of Dirichlet priors (NSB prior).
Complementary Maximum Probability: 1−maxj {pj};
Complementary Gini: 1−G where G is the Gini coefficient of the count distribution {Nj}j=1...7.
The above metrics all capture the idea that the partisan diversity of the audience of a web
domain should be reflected in the distribution of its traffic across different partisan groups. Each
weighs the contribution of each individual person who visits the domain equally; they can thus be
regarded as user-level measures of audience partisan diversity. However, the volume and content
of web browsing activity is highly heterogeneous across internet users [17, 27], with different users
recording different numbers of pageviews to the same website. To account for this imbalance, we
also compute the weighted variants of the above audience partisan diversity metrics where, instead
of treating all visitors equally, each individual visitor is weighted by the number of pageviews they
made to any given domain.
As a robustness check, we compare the strength of association of each of these metrics to news
reliability in the Supplementary Materials. We find that all variants correlate with news reliability,
but the relationship is strongest for variance.
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C. Incorporating audience partisan diversity into collaborative filtering recommendations
In general, a recommendation algorithm takes a set of users U and a set of items D and learns
a function f : U × D → R that assigns a real value to each user-item pair (u, d) representing the
interest of user u in item d. This value denotes the estimated rating that user u will give to item
d. In the context of the present study, D is a set of news sources identified by their web domains
(e.g., nytimes.com, wsj.com), so from now on we will refer to d ∈ D interchangeably as either a
web domain or a generic item.
Collaborative filtering is a classic recommendation algorithm in which some ratings are provided
as input and unknown ratings are predicted based on those known input ratings. In particular,
the user-based CF algorithm, which we employ here, seeks to provide the best recommendations
for users by learning from others with similar preferences. CF therefore requires a user-domain
matrix where each entry is either known or needs to be predicted by the algorithm. Once the
ratings are predicted, the algorithm creates a ranked list of domains for each user that are sorted
in descending order by their predicted ratings.
To test the standard CF algorithm and our modified CF+D algorithm, we first construct a
user-domain matrix V from the YouGov Pulse panel. The YouGov Pulse dataset does not provide
user ratings of domains, so we instead count the number of times piu,d ∈ Z+ a user u has visited a
domain d (i.e., pageviews) and use this variable as a proxy [23]. Because this quantity is known to
follow a very skewed distribution, we compute the rating as the TF-IDF of the pageview counts:
vu,d =
piu,d∑
h piu,h
log
(
pi∑
u piu,d
)
(3)
where pi =
∑
u
∑
d piu,d is the total number of visits. Note that if a user has never visited a
particular domain, then vu,d = 0. Therefore, if we arrange all the ratings into a user-domain
matrix V ∈ R|U|×|D|, such that (V )u,d = vu,d, we will obtain a sparse matrix. The goal of any
recommendation task is to complete the user-domain matrix by predicting the missing ratings,
which in turn allows us to recommend new web domains to users that they may not have seen. In
this case, however, we lack data on completely unseen domains. To test the validity of our methods,
we therefore follow the customary practice in machine learning of setting aside some data to be
used purely for testing (see Methods D).
Having defined V , the next step of the algorithm is to estimate the similarity between each pair
of users. To do so, we use either the Pearson correlation coefficient or the Kendall rank correlation
of their user vectors; i.e., their corresponding row vectors in V (i.e., zeroes included). For example,
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if τ(·, ·) ∈ [−1, 1] denotes the Kendall rank correlation coefficient between two sets of observations,
then the corresponding coefficient of similarity between u ∈ U and u′ ∈ U can be defined as:
sim(u, u′) =
τ(Vu, Vu′) + 1
2
(4)
where Vu, Vu′ ∈ R1×|U| are the row vectors of u and u′, respectively. A similar definition can be
used for Pearson’s correlation coefficient in place of τ .
These similarity coefficients are in turn used to calculate the predicted ratings. In the standard
user-based CF, the predicted rating of a user u for a domain d is calculated as:
vˆCFu,d = v¯u +
∑
u′∈Nud sim(u, u
′)(vu′,d − v¯u′)∑
u′∈Nud sim(u, u
′)
(5)
where Nud ⊆ U is the set of the n = 10 most similar users to u who have also rated d (i.e., the
neighbors of u), vu′,d is the observed rating (computed with Eq. 3) that neighboring user u
′ has
given to domain d, v¯u and v¯u′ are the average ratings of u and u
′ across all domains they visited,
respectively, and sim(u, u′) is the similarity coefficient (computed with Eq. 4) between users u and
u′ based on either the Pearson or the Kendall correlation coefficient.
Having defined the standard CF in Eq. 5, we now define our variant CF+D, which incorporates
audience partisan diversity of domain d ∈ D as a re-ranking signal in the following way:
vˆCF+Du,d = vˆ
CF
u,d + g (δd) (6)
where g (δd) is the re-ranking term of domain d, obtained by plugging the audience partisan diversity
δd (for example, we use the variance of the distribution of self-reported partisan slants of its visitors,
δd = σ
2
d) into a standard logistic function:
g(δ) =
a
1 + exp
(− (δ − t) /ψ) . (7)
In Eq. 7, parameters a, ψ, and t generalize the upper asymptote, inverse growth rate, and location
of the standard logistic function, respectively. For the results reported in this study we empirically
estimate the location as t = δ¯, the average audience partisan diversity across all domains, which
corresponds to the value of δ¯ = 4.25 since we measure diversity as the variance of the distribution
of self-reported partisan slants. For the remaining parameters, we choose a = 1, ψ = 1. As a
robustness check, we re-ran all analyses with a larger value of a and obtained qualitatively similar
results (available upon reasonable request).
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D. Supervised learning evaluation workflow
To evaluate both recommendation algorithms, we follow a standard supervised learning work-
flow. We use precision and root mean squared error (RMSE), two standard metrics used to measure
the relevance and accuracy of predicted ratings in supervised learning settings. We define these
two metrics elsewhere (see Methods F). Here, we instead describe the workflow we followed to
evaluate the recommendation methods. Since our approach is based on supervision, we need to
designate some of the user ratings (i.e., the number of visits to each domain, which are computed
using Eq. 3) as ground truth to compute performance metrics.
For each user, we randomly split the domains they visited into a training set (70%) and a testing
set (30%). This splitting varies by user: the same domain could be included in the training set of
a user and in the testing set of another. Then, given any two users, their training set ratings are
used to compute user-user similarities using Eq. 4 (which is based on Kendall’s rank correlation
coefficient; a similar formula can be defined using Pearson’s correlation). If, in computing user-user
similarities with Eq. 4, a domain is present for a user but not for the other, then the latter rating is
assumed to be zero regardless of whether the domain is present in testing or not. This assumption,
which follows standard practice in collaborative filtering algorithm, ensures that there is no leaking
of information between the test and training sets.
Finally, using either Eq. 5 or Eq. 6, we predict ratings for domains in the test set and compare
them with the TF-IDF of the actual visit counts in the data.
E. Trustworthiness metrics
In addition to standard metrics of accuracy (Precision and RMSE; see Methods F), we define
a new metric called trustworthiness to measure the news reliability of the recommended domains.
It is calculated using the NewsGuard scores in two ways: either using the numerical scores or the
set of binary indicators for whether a site meets or exceeds the threshold score of 60 defined by
NewsGuard as indicating that a site is generally trustworthy [29]. Let d1, d2, . . . , dk be a ranked
list of domains. Using numerical scores, the trustworthiness is the average:
1
k
k∑
r=1
Q(dr) (8)
where Q(d) ∈ [0, 100] denotes the NewsGuard reliability score of d ∈ D.
If instead we use the binary indicator of trustworthiness provided by Newguard, then the trust-
worthiness of domains in a list is defined as the fraction of domains that meet or exceed the
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threshold score. Note that, unlike precision and RMSE, the trustworthiness of a list of recommen-
dations does not use information on the actual ratings vu,d. Instead, using Eq. 8, we compute the
trustworthiness of the domains in the test set ranked in decreasing order of user visits vu,d. We
then compare the trustworthiness of the rankings obtained with either CF or CF+D against the
trustworthiness of this baseline.
F. Accuracy metrics
Given a user u, let us consider a set D of web domains for which |D| = D. For each domain
d ∈ D, we have three pieces of information: the two predicted ratings vˆCFu,d and vˆCF+Du,d produced by
CF and CF+D and the actual rating vu,d (defined elsewhere; see Methods C). In the following, we
omit the subscript u of the user, which is fixed throughout, and the CF/CF+D superscript unless
it is not obvious from context.
Let us consider a given recommendation method (either CF or CF+D) and denote with r(d)
(respectively, r′(d)) the rank of d when the domains are sorted by decreasing order of recommen-
dation and actual ratings, respectively. Given a recommendation list length 0 < k ≤ D, let us
define the set of predicted domains as:
Pk = {d ∈ D : r(d) ≤ k}
and the set of actual domains as:
Ak = {d ∈ D : r′(d) ≤ k}.
Then the precision for a given value of k is given by the fraction of correctly predicted domains:
Precision =
|Pk ∩Ak|
|Pk| .
Similarly, the root mean squared error for a given value of k between the two ranked lists of ratings
is computed as:
RMSE =
√√√√1
k
k∑
r=1
(
vˆρ(r) − vρ′(r)
)2
where ρ : [D] 7→ D (respectively ρ′) is the inverse function of r(·) (respectively, r′(·)); that is, the
function that maps ranks back to their domain by the recommendation method (respectively, by
actual visits). Note that, in the summation, ρ(r) and ρ′(r) do not generally refer to the same
web domain: the averaging is over the two ranked lists of ratings, not over the set of domains in
common between the two lists.
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G. Discounting via ranking
To measure the effect of CF+D on the trustworthiness of rankings, we must select a particular
list length k. Although Fig. 4 shows improvements for all values of k, one potential problem when
stratifying on different groups of users is that the results could depend on the particular choice
of k. To avoid dependence on k, we consider a probabilistic model of a hypothetical user visiting
web domains from a ranked list of recommendations (Eq. 1) and define overall trustworthiness as
the expected value of the trustworthiness of domains selected from that list (i.e., discounted by
probability of selection). This procedure allows us to compute, for any given user, the effect of
a recommendation method (either CF or CF+D) simply as the difference between its expected
trustworthiness and the trustworthiness of the ranking obtained by sorting the domains visited by
the user in decreasing order of pageviews (see Eq. 2).
In practice, to compute Eq. 2, let d1, d2, . . . , dk and d
′
1, d
′
2, . . . , d
′
k be two ranked lists of domains,
dr, d
′
r ∈ D ∀r = 1, . . . , k, generated by a recommendation algorithm and by actual user pageviews,
respectively, and let us denote with Q(d) the NewsGuard reliability score of d ∈ D (see Methods E).
Recall that Eq. 1 specifies the probability of selecting a given domain d ∈ D from a particular ranked
list as a function of its rank. Even though any pair of equally-ranked domains will be different
across these two lists (that is, dr 6= d′r in general), their probability will be the same because Eq. 1
only depends on r. We can thus calculate the expected improvement in trustworthiness as:
∆Q =
k∑
r=1
P (r)
(
Q (dr)−Q
(
d′r
))
(9)
where P (r) is the probability of selecting a domain with rank r from Eq. (1), which we computed
setting α = 1.
H. Stratification analysis
Recall that we use the self-reported partisanship of respondents in the YouGov Pulse panel as
the basis for our diversity signal (see Methods B). To avoid the circular reasoning in stratifying
on the same source of data, Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(c) group these users according to the slant of
their actual news consumption, which may not necessarily reflect their self-reported partisanship
(e.g., a self-reported Democrat might access mostly conservative-leaning websites). We determined
this latter metric using an external classification originally proposed by Bakshy et al. [5], who
estimated the slant of 500 web domains focused on hard news topics. In practice, Bakshy et al.
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based their classification on how hard news from those domains were shared on Facebook by users
who self-identified as liberal or conservative in their profile. For almost all domains, Bakshy et al.
reported a value s ∈ [−1, 1] with a value of s = +1 for domains that are shared almost exclusively
by conservatives, and a value of s = −1 for those shared almost exclusively by liberals. (These
values could technically vary over [−2, 2] but only 1% of domains fell outside [−1, 1] using the
measurement approach described by Bakshy et al. [5].)
In Fig. 6(c), respondents are grouped according to the absolute slant |s| of the visited domains
where a value of |s| = 0 denotes domains with a perfectly centrist slant and a value of |s| = 1
indicates domains with extreme liberal or conservative slants (i.e., they are almost exclusively
shared by one group and not the other).
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
All authors designed the research. S.B. and S.Y. performed data analysis. All authors wrote,
reviewed, and approved the manuscript.
ETHICS STATEMENT
This study was reviewed by the IRB under protocols #HUM00161944 (University of Michigan)
and #STUDY000433 (University of South Florida).
CODE AND DATA AVAILABILITY
Data necessary to reproduce the findings in the manuscript are available, in aggregated and
anonymized format, at https://github.com/glciampaglia/InfoDiversity/ along with the as-
sociated source code. To reproduce the findings in the Supplementary Materials, additional code
and data are available upon reasonable request.
The raw data that support the findings of this study are available from NewsGuard Technology,
Inc. but restrictions apply to the availability of these data, which were used under license for the
current study and thus cannot be made publicly available. Data are however available from the
authors upon reasonable request subject to licensing from NewsGuard. The data used in this study
were current as of November 12, 2019 and do not reflect NewsGuard’s regular updates of the data.
22
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank NewsGuard for licensing the data and acknowledge Andrew Guess and Jason Reifler,
Nyhan’s coauthors on the research project that generated the web traffic data used in this study.
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under a collaborative award
(NSF Grant No. 1915833, 1949077). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations
expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Science Foundation.
[1] Adler, B. T. and de Alfaro, L. (2007). A content-driven reputation system for the Wikipedia. In
Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on World Wide Web, WWW ’07, pages 261–270,
New York, NY, USA. ACM.
[2] Allcott, H. and Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 31(2):211–36.
[3] Allen, J., Howland, B., Mobius, M., Rothschild, D., and Watts, D. J. (2020). Evaluating the fake news
problem at the scale of the information ecosystem. Science Advances, 6(14).
[4] Avram, M., Micallef, N., Patil, S., and Menczer, F. (2020). Exposure to social engagement metrics
increases vulnerability to misinformation. Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review. In press.
Preprint arXiv:2005.04682.
[5] Bakshy, E., Messing, S., and Adamic, L. (2015). Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on
Facebook. Science, 348(6239):1130–1132.
[6] Chen, W., Pacheco, D., Yang, K.-C., and Menczer, F. (2020). Neutral bots reveal political bias on
social media. arXiv e-print 2005.08141, CoRR.
[7] Cho, J.-H., Chan, K., and Adali, S. (2015). A survey on trust modeling. ACM Comput. Surv.,
48(2):28:1–28:40.
[8] Ciampaglia, G. L., Nematzadeh, A., Menczer, F., and Flammini, A. (2018). How algorithmic popularity
bias hinders or promotes quality. Scientific Reports, 8(1):15951–.
[9] Flaxman, S., Goel, S., and Rao, J. M. (2016). Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and online news con-
sumption. Public opinion quarterly, 80(S1):298–320.
[10] Fortunato, S., Flammini, A., and Menczer, F. (2006). Scale-free network growth by ranking. Physical
review letters, 96(21):218701.
[11] Germano, F., Go´mez, V., and Le Mens, G. (2019). The few-get-richer: A surprising consequence of
popularity-based rankings? In The World Wide Web Conference, WWW ’19, pages 2764–2770, New
York, NY, USA. ACM.
23
[12] Goel, S., Broder, A., Gabrilovich, E., and Pang, B. (2010). Anatomy of the long tail: Ordinary people
with extraordinary tastes. In Proceedings of the Third ACM International Conference on Web Search
and Data Mining, WSDM 10, page 201210, New York, NY, USA. Association for Computing Machinery.
[13] Golbeck, J. A. (2005). Computing and applying trust in web-based social networks. PhD thesis, Uni-
versity of Maryland at College Park.
[14] Grinberg, N., Joseph, K., Friedland, L., Swire-Thompson, B., and Lazer, D. (2019). Fake news on
Twitter during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Science, 363(6425):374–378.
[15] Guess, A., Lyons, B., Nyhan, B., and Reifler, J. (2018). Avoiding the echo chamber about echo cham-
bers: Why selective exposure to like-minded political news is less prevalent than you think. Technical
report, Knight Foundation.
[16] Guess, A., Nagler, J., and Tucker, J. (2019). Less than you think: Prevalence and predictors of fake
news dissemination on Facebook. Science Advances, 5(1).
[17] Guess, A. M. (2018). (almost) everything in moderation: New evidence on americans’ online media
diets. Unpublished manuscript.
[18] Guess, A. M., Nyhan, B., and Reifler, J. (2020). Exposure to untrustworthy websites in the 2016 US
election. Nature Human Behaviour, 4(5):472–480.
[19] Gupta, A., Kumaraguru, P., Castillo, C., and Meier, P. (2014). TweetCred: Real-Time Credibility
Assessment of Content on Twitter, pages 228–243. Springer International Publishing, Cham.
[20] Hart, W., Albarrac´ın, D., Eagly, A. H., Brechan, I., Lindberg, M. J., and Merrill, L. (2009). Feeling
validated versus being correct: a meta-analysis of selective exposure to information. Psychological
Bulletin, 135(4):555.
[21] Hogg, T. and Lerman, K. (2015). Disentangling the effects of social signals. Human Computation,
2(2):189–208.
[22] Hong, L. and Page, S. E. (2004). Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-
ability problem solvers. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 101(46):16385–16389.
[23] Joachims, T., Granka, L., Pan, B., Hembrooke, H., and Gay, G. (2017). Accurately interpreting
clickthrough data as implicit feedback. SIGIR Forum, 51(1):411.
[24] Konstan, J. A., Miller, B. N., Maltz, D., Herlocker, J. L., Gordon, L. R., and Riedl, J. (1997). Grou-
pLens: Applying collaborative filtering to usenet news. Commun. ACM, 40(3):7787.
[25] Lazer, D., Baum, M., Benkler, Y., Berinsky, A., Greenhill, K., Menczer, F., Metzger, M., Nyhan, B.,
Pennycook, G., Rothschild, D., Schudson, M., Sloman, S., Sunstein, C., Thorson, E., Watts, D., and
Zittrain, J. (2018). The science of fake news. Science, 359(6380):1094–1096.
[26] Macy, M., Deri, S., Ruch, A., and Tong, N. (2019). Opinion cascades and the unpredictability of
partisan polarization. Science Advances, 5(8).
[27] Montgomery, A. L. and Faloutsos, C. (2001). Identifying web browsing trends and patterns. Computer,
34(7):94–95.
24
[28] Nemenman, I., Shafee, F., and Bialek, W. (2001). Entropy and inference, revisited. In Proceedings of
the 14th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems: Natural and Synthetic,
NIPS’01, pages 471–478, Cambridge, MA, USA. MIT Press.
[29] NewsGuard, Inc. (2020). Rating process and criteria. Retrieved from Internet Archive: https:
//web.archive.org/web/20200630151704/https://www.newsguardtech.com/ratings/
rating-process-criteria/.
[30] Nikolov, D., Lalmas, M., Flammini, A., and Menczer, F. (2019). Quantifying biases in online informa-
tion exposure. Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology, 70(3):218–229.
[31] Pennycook, G. and Rand, D. G. (2019). Fighting misinformation on social media using crowdsourced
judgments of news source quality. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(7):2521–2526.
[32] Resnick, P., Iacovou, N., Suchak, M., Bergstrom, P., and Riedl, J. (1994). GroupLens: An open
architecture for collaborative filtering of netnews. In Proceedings of the 1994 ACM Conference on
Computer Supported Cooperative Work, CSCW 94, page 175186, New York, NY, USA. Association for
Computing Machinery.
[33] Salganik, M. J., Dodds, P. S., and Watts, D. J. (2006). Experimental study of inequality and unpre-
dictability in an artificial cultural market. Science, 311(5762):854–856.
[34] Shao, C., Ciampaglia, G. L., Varol, O., Yang, K., Flammini, A., and Menczer, F. (2018). The spread
of low-credibility content by social bots. Nature Communications, 9(1):4787.
[35] Shi, F., Teplitskiy, M., Duede, E., and Evans, J. A. (2019). The wisdom of polarized crowds. Nature
Human Behaviour, 3(4):329–336.
[36] Shmargad, Y. and Klar, S. (2020). Sorting the news: How ranking by popularity polarizes our politics.
Political Communication, 37(3):423–446.
[37] Stella, M., Ferrara, E., and De Domenico, M. (2018). Bots increase exposure to negative and inflamma-
tory content in online social systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(49):12435–
12440.
[38] Varol, O., Ferrara, E., Davis, C., Menczer, F., and Flammini, A. (2017). Online human-bot interactions:
Detection, estimation, and characterization. In Proc. Eleventh Intl AAAI Conference on Web and Social
Media, ICWSM ’17, pages 280–289, Palo Alto, Calif., USA. AAAI.
[39] Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., and Aral, S. (2018). The spread of true and false news online. Science,
359(6380):1146–1151.
[40] Yang, K.-C., Torres-Lugo, C., and Menczer, F. (2020a). Prevalence of low-credibility information on
Twitter during the COVID-19 outbreak. In Proc. Fourteenth Intl AAAI Conference on Web and Social
Media, ICWSM ’20, Palo Alto, Calif., USA. AAAI.
[41] Yang, K.-C., Varol, O., Davis, C. A., Ferrara, E., Flammini, A., and Menczer, F. (2019). Arming the
public with artificial intelligence to counter social bots. Human Behavior and Emerging Technologies,
1(1):48–61.
25
[42] Yang, K.-C., Varol, O., Hui, P.-M., and Menczer, F. (2020b). Scalable and generalizable social bot
detection through data selection. In Proc. 34th AAAI Conf. on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI).
[43] Zhang, A. X., Ranganathan, A., Metz, S. E., Appling, S., Sehat, C. M., Gilmore, N., Adams, N. B.,
Vincent, E., Lee, J., Robbins, M., Bice, E., Hawke, S., Karger, D., and Mina, A. X. (2018). A
structured response to misinformation: Defining and annotating credibility indicators in news articles.
In Companion Proc. of The Web Conference 2018, WWW ’18, pages 603–612, Republic and Canton
of Geneva, Switzerland. Intl. World Wide Web Conf. Steering Committee.
[44] Ziegler, C.-N., McNee, S. M., Konstan, J. A., and Lausen, G. (2005). Improving recommendation lists
through topic diversification. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on World Wide Web,
WWW ’05, pages 22–32, New York, NY, USA. ACM.
26
Supplementary Materials for Bhadani et al.,
“Political audience diversity and news reliability in
algorithmic ranking”
S1. ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF AUDIENCE DIVERSITY
We repeat the analysis of Fig. 3 for all diversity metrics (see Methods B) and summarize the
results in Table S1. For each metric, we estimate the degree of linear association with news quality
using the Pearson correlation coefficient. We also report the R2 coefficient of determination and the
two-sided p-value of the F-statistic as a measure of significance of the fit. Each metric is positively
correlated with quality at the user level, but we find that the relationship is strongest for variance
of audience partisanship. At the pageview level, however, the association disappears for all metrics
but variance, which still produces a modest correlation.
TABLE S1. Relationship between audience partisan diversity and news quality.
Diversity metric Correlation R2 p-value
user level
Variance 0.32 0.10 < 0.01
Entropy (Dir.) 0.21 0.04 < 0.01
Entropy (ML) 0.20 0.04 < 0.01
Entropy (NSB) 0.22 0.05 < 0.01
Compl. Max. Prob. 0.06 0.00 0.03
Compl. Gini 0.14 0.02 < 0.01
pageview level
Variance 0.14 0.02 < 0.01
Entropy (Dir.) -0.02 0.00 0.58
Entropy (ML) -0.02 0.00 0.62
Entropy (NSB) -0.02 0.00 0.61
Compl. Max. Prob. -0.04 0.00 0.14
Compl. Gini -0.03 0.00 0.26
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S2. REGRESSION OF NEWSGUARD SCORES ON WEBSITE AUDIENCE VARIANCE
In Fig. 3 in the main text we show the relationship between NewsGuard reliability scores of
news domains and audience partisan diversity, via linear regression. In Tab. S2–S3 we report
the associated summary tables for both the user and pageview level, respectively. To ensure the
regression coefficients and associated errors can be comparable across datasets, we standardize all
variables prior to fitting the models to the data.
TABLE S2. Relationship between NewsGuard scores and user-level partisan audience diversity
All Republican websites Democratic websites
User-level variance in partisanship 0.1905∗∗∗ 0.4095∗∗∗ 0.1558∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.050) (0.030)
Constant 0.1905∗∗∗ 0.3212∗∗∗ 0.0950∗
(0.282) (0.069) (0.040)
Observations 1,020 237 783
R2 0.115 0.223 0.033
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
TABLE S3. Relationship between NewsGuard scores and pageview-level partisan audience diversity
All Republican websites Democratic websites
Pageview-level variance in partisanship 0.1659∗∗∗ 0.3016∗∗∗ 0.0381
(0.030) (0.069) (0.034)
Constant 0.1013∗∗ 0.2131∗∗ 0.02132∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.079) (0.041)
Observations 1,020 237 783
R2 0.029 0.075 0.002
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
28
S3. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Figs. S1 and S2 are the analogous of Figs. 4 and 5 from the main text, but unlike the plots
in the main text, which capped the range of k to include only bins with a minimum frequency,
the plots here show all possible values of k. In these and all the following plots, error bars (when
present) represent the standard error of the mean.
Figs. S3 and S4 also show the results of analyses analogous to those in Figs. 4 and 5, but unlike
the plots in the main text, which used the Kendall rank correlation coefficient to compute the
similarity between users, the plots here show the results obtained using the correlation coefficient
of Pearson. Moreover, the plots here show all possible values of k, without the aforementioned cap.
Note that in general Pearson leads to smaller recommendation lists. To get a better sense sense of
this difference, Fig. S5 shows the distribution of the number of users as a function of the length of
the ranked list k.
Finally, Figs. S6–S12 present results analogous to those in Fig. 6, but using specific values of k.
FIG. S1. Trustworthiness of recommended domains by length of ranked list k, for all values of k. Left: Trust-
worthiness based on scores from NewsGuard [29]. Right: proportion of domains labeled as ‘trustworthy’,
also by NewsGuard. Actual visits v are normalized using TF-IDF (see Methods C). Each bin represents the
average computed on the top-k recommendations for all users in the YouGov panel with ≥ k recommenda-
tions in their test sets. Bars represent the standard error of the mean. In this figure, both CF and CF+D
compute the similarity between users using the Kendall τ correlation coefficient (see Methods C).
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FIG. S2. Accuracy of domain recommendations by length of ranked list k, for all values of k. Left: Precision
(proportion of correctly ranked sites) by length of ranked list k (higher is better). Right: RMSE (root
mean squared error) of predicted pageviews for top k ranked domains by length of ranked list k (lower is
better). Each bin represents the average computed on the top-k recommendations of all users with ≥ k
recommendations in their test sets. Bars represent the standard error of the mean. In the last bin (k = 73)
precision is 100% for all users. In this figure, both CF and CF+D compute the similarity between users
using the Kendall τ correlation coefficient (see Methods C).
FIG. S3. Trustworthiness of recommended domains by length of ranked list k, for all values of k. Left: Trust-
worthiness based on scores from NewsGuard [29]. Right: proportion of domains labeled as ‘trustworthy’,
also by NewsGuard. Actual visits v are normalized using TF-IDF (see Methods C). All results represent
averages computed for all users in the YouGov panel. Bars represent the standard error of the mean. In this
figure, both CF and CF+D compute the similarity between users using the Pearson correlation coefficient.
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FIG. S4. Accuracy of domain recommendations by length of ranked list, for all values of k. Left: Precision
(proportion of correctly ranked sites) by length of ranked list k (higher is better). Right: RMSE (root
mean squared error) of predicted pageviews for top k ranked domains by length of ranked list k (lower is
better). Each bin represents the average computed on the top-k recommendations of all users with ≥ k
recommendations in their test sets. Bars represent the standard error of the mean. In the last bin (k = 30)
precision is 100% for all users. Bars represent the standard error of the mean. In this figure, both CF and
CF+D compute the similarity between users using the Pearson correlation coefficient.
FIG. S5. Number of users with k domains in the test set for neighborhoods (the set of the n = 10 most
similar users to a given user) computed using the correlation coefficient of Kendall (solid line) and Pearson
(dashed line). In general, Pearson leads to shorter lists of recommendations.
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FIG. S6. Effect of CF and CF+D versus baseline by ideological slant of visited domains (terciles using scores
from Bakshy et al. [5]) and by length of ranked list k. In this and the following plots, bars represent the
standard error of the mean. Change in trustworthiness ∆Q based on scores from NewsGuard [29].
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FIG. S7. Effect of CF and CF+D versus baseline by self-reported party ID from YouGov Pulse responses
as measured on a 7-point scale (1–3: Democrats including people who lean Democrat but do not identify as
Democrats, 4: Independents, 5–7: Republicans including people who lean Republican but do not identify
as Republicans) and by length of ranked list k. Change in trustworthiness ∆Q based on scores from
NewsGuard [29].
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FIG. S8. Effect of CF and CF+D versus baseline by absolute slant of visited domains (terciles using scores
from Bakshy et al.) and by length of ranked list k. Change in trustworthiness ∆Q based on scores from
NewsGuard [29].
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FIG. S9. Effect of CF and CF+D versus baseline by total online activity (TF-IDF-transformed pageviews;
terciles) and by length of ranked list k. Change in trustworthiness ∆Q based on scores from NewsGuard [29].
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FIG. S10. Effect of CF and CF+D versus baseline by distinct number of domains visited (terciles) and by
length of ranked list k. Change in trustworthiness ∆Q based on scores from NewsGuard [29].
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FIG. S11. Effect of CF and CF+D versus baseline by average user–user similarity with nearest n = 10
neighbors in training set (terciles) and by length of ranked list k. Change in trustworthiness ∆Q based on
scores from NewsGuard [29].
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FIG. S12. Effect of CF and CF+D versus baseline by baseline trustworthiness of domains visited by users
(terciles) and by length of ranked list k. Change in trustworthiness ∆Q based on scores from NewsGuard [29].
